The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics has over 44,000 professional and student members. Members are drawn from throughout the scientific and engineering disciplines within the aerospace industry. Nearly half of AIAA members are specifically involved in the research, design, development, test, production or operation of military aerospace systems as members of the private or public sectors of the defense/industrial base.

Substantial changes have occurred in the defense policy landscape since AIAA testified last year before this committee. We are pleased to see that a number of our recommendations have been adopted by the Congress, including increases in the funding for the Science & Technology base; the decision to allow industry to fully recover Independent Research and Development Costs; and the rising concern in the Department of Defense and in the Congress over maintaining our future defense industrial base.

Our testimony today will

1. Address the national debate on weapons systems
acquisition and the "prototyping strategy,"

2.

3.

Suggest a framework for what we believe would be a
workable strategy, and

Provide some specific recommendations for how to assure a viable continuing industrial base for defense.

The Prototyping Defense Acquisition strategy

The most talked about new strategy today is one that would emphasize the use of prototypes in the weapons system acquisition process. For several years, The AIAA has advocated increasing the frequency of prototypes and technology demonstrators for the development and testing of new technologies. We are pleased to see this philosophy gaining stature in the Department of Defense and Congress in this time when defense procurement of production systems is sure to decline. We recommend prototyping because it can keep the pace of our technology advancement up to acceptable levels. It will keep critically important design and integration teams together. It will provide for systems level testing of new discoveries in the laboratories. It will give us the opportunity to test against predicted performance to reduce risk before committing to engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) of selected concepts. And Prototyping is the first step in maintaining clearly superior weapons systems for future insertion into the downsized military forces.

Framework For A New Defense Acquisition strategy

It is clear to all observers and participants in this discussion on defense and acquisition strategy that the world has changed. It has changed such that the sheer magnitude or quantity of our defense forces can be significantly reduced. We need not belabor the details of the old bi-polar vs the new multi-polar world and the resulting need for a regional conflict defense posture, or any of the other obvious aspects of the new environment. We do need to recognize, however, that our sucesses in Desert Storm and Just Cause have produced a new political reality. The American public now believes that our superior technologies can and will provide our leaders and troops the ability to produce quick and decisive victory with minimal loss of life whenever and wherever it is called upon. The objective of a new defense and acquisition strategy must be to maintain our ability to provide the superior equipment and people necessary to maintain this posture. Since technology never stands still (here in the U.S. or abroad), it will be necessary to continuously improve the technical quality of our systems and equipment fielded in the active and reserve ready forces.

It is also clear that the acquisition of defense systems should not be simply reduced across the board in proportion to the budget reductions, and that to do so would surely not give us the most effective composition of new forces and weapons.

Most would agree that the following were major contributors to success in Desert Storm:

1. Clearly superior theater and battlefield leaders.

2.

Superior intelligence systems and planners.

3. Mobility and logistics.

4.

High technology, high quality weapon systems that our
defense industrial base developed and produced.

5. Superior, well-trained troops in the field operating and maintaining these modern systems.

6. Readily available bases, free fuels, friendly ports, unopposed sea and air lift, unchallenged intelligence and surveillance systems, and months to prepare.

The acquisition strategy that emphasizes prototypes and technology demonstrators without production and delivery to the troops in the field, or even if it includes low rate production of "silver bullet" systems, will not provide all the components of victory cited in the above. A new acquisition strategy should include:

1.

Continued insertion of affordable advanced technology
systems in the field where the users can develop
appropriate new tactics, work out the bugs that may

2.

3.

4.

remain, and train and maintain to develop the proficiency necessary to have a ready deterrent force, both CONUS based and forward deployed to provide deterrent presence.

See

Continued engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)
of advanced systems at approximately the same new start
rate as has been the average over the past 15 years.
Figure 1. If the EMD new start rate is allowed to
dwindle further, then the time from lab to field of new
technologies will continue to increase. Pretty soon our
5-year technology lead is lost, absorbed in the length of
the process.

We believe

The affordability of this can be questioned.
that reductions in total production quantity to fit the
smaller force will result in more than enough Savings to
continue new starts at near the historical rate. See
Figures 2 and 3. The result can be a preservation of
design and manufacturing skills that will otherwise
disappear.

Increased prototyping and technology demonstration of
innovative new technology systems to maintain a stable of
the best advanced concepts from which later selections
for EMD and production can be made.

Modest increases in tech base (6.1 and 6.2) funded projects to provide the technology base from which to select features and concepts for systems prototyping and technology demonstration validation.

If a revolution is needed, it is in the manufacturing and production phase of the process. Industry must plan and design production plants for lower rate production than that for which they are currently designed. For example; the F-16 factory is

designed to handle as many as 40 aircraft per month and efficiency optimizes in the neighborhood of 25-30 on a 2-1/2 shift basis. Obviously, when the rate reduces to 4 per month, the plant can be expected to become inefficient. In the future, Industry must plan from the outset for lower-rates and optimize production accordingly. When this is done, the cost premium paid for lower rate will be reduced.

Reconstitution in the event of a perceived major emerging threat comparable to the Cold War Soviet Union would require a large, but probably not massive, increase in the rates of production and fielding of new systems. This can be accomplished by simply adding shifts or replicating the tooling and manufacturing of the then-existing efficient production lines. This could allow us to double or triple production rate in a matter of months. Then the necessary quantity of systems would be in the field ready for the training of new recruits within a matter of three to four years, allowing a reconstituted, trained and ready force to be accomplished in five to six years.

Defense Industrial Base

The acquisition strategy described above will provide a continuous reduced-rate flow of modern systems into the field. In this plan, therefore, the defense industrial base will not go into suspended animation, but will continue to function on most if not all cylinders, at a much reduced rate of production. The transition will be painful. It is important that adjustments be made on the government side to allow a viable downsized industrial base to survive.

It will be necessary that the terms and conditions and profit rates on R&D work be established that will allow a financially healthy defense industry.

The Final Report of the Packard Commission emphasized the need for the procurement process to promote trust and cooperation between Service customers and system contractors. Current reviews of contract law (now being undertaken by the DoD Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law) should be used as a vehicle for further relaxation of expensive confrontational obligations.

It is also important that prototype and technology demos be funded without consideration of whether or not EMD and production funds are programmed in the SYDP. None of the five prototypes of the 70's and 80's (Have Blue, YF-16, YF-17, YC-14, YC-15) were programmed for out year funding at the time of prototyping. Stumbling blocks to the sale of weapons systems to friendly foreign nations should be removed and replaced by pro-active support in the government Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and in the Congress. Government and industry must cooperate to avoid cases in which friendly foreign governments are forced to go to our foreign competitors because our government policies forbid the sale of weapons to them.

Summary

The American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics is pleased to have this opportunity to present our thoughts to this committee. We strongly support the notion that a strategy for downsizing and maintaining an effective defense force supported by a healthy industrial base is necessary. There are many things about the prototyping strategy that are good. Deterrence of future threats depends on maintaining a perceived and real superiority. We have suggested a framework for what we believe is a workable and potentially successful strategy and plan. have suggested some specific measures for maintaining a viable defense industrial base, albeit smaller. Let us not forget what brought us to this very favorable position which now allows our government to place more attention and national resources on the important quality-of-life issues of our society, culture, and citizens.

The AIAA thanks you for this opportunity to appear.

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