Rural Finance for Food Security for the Poor: Implications for Research and PolicyInternational Food Policy Research Institute, 1997 - 139 من الصفحات A broader role for rural finance for food security. The saving and borrowing behavior of the food-insecure poor. Innovative rural finance for the poor: a food security perspective. Conclusions for research and policy. |
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النتائج 1-3 من 7
الصفحة 31
... asymmetry and moral hazard by establishing long - term relationships between the partners . The institutional arrangements tend to reduce information asymmetry between market partners through repeated economic and social inter- actions 31.
... asymmetry and moral hazard by establishing long - term relationships between the partners . The institutional arrangements tend to reduce information asymmetry between market partners through repeated economic and social inter- actions 31.
الصفحة 36
... Information asymmetries " exist between bor- rower and lender because the borrower knows whether he intends to ... asymmetry and moral hazard by demanding collateral that they can seize in case of loan default . Collateral ...
... Information asymmetries " exist between bor- rower and lender because the borrower knows whether he intends to ... asymmetry and moral hazard by demanding collateral that they can seize in case of loan default . Collateral ...
الصفحة 37
... information asymmetries between the market partners . High transaction costs are major impediments for catering financial services to the poor . Since transaction costs have the character of fixed costs , smaller transactions ( that is ...
... information asymmetries between the market partners . High transaction costs are major impediments for catering financial services to the poor . Since transaction costs have the character of fixed costs , smaller transactions ( that is ...
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عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
access to credit access to financial allocation Bangladesh behavior Braun Cameroon collateral consumption credit consumption smoothing cooperative covariate risks credit and savings credit constraints credit groups credit limit credit markets credit programs d'Epargne default demand developing countries economic effects financial intermediaries financial market development financial sector financial services Food Policy Research food security formal credit formal sector framework funds Gambia Grameen Bank Heidhues household food security human capital IFAD income individual informal financial information asymmetry inputs institutional arrangements institutional innovation insurance services interest rates International Food Policy intertemporal labor lenders liquidity loans macroeconomic Madagascar Malawi member-based institutions ment moral hazard Mudzi nutritional percent Pischke Policy Research Institute poor households potential precautionary savings production repayment rural financial institutions rural financial markets rural households rural poor savers savings and credit Schrieder self-help groups social strategies sumption sustainability tercile tion transaction costs transitory food insecurity village banks World Bank Zeller