uncertainties require continued concerns for our defenses. This is the price of victory in the Cold War. The change from the past and the promise of the future make it a price worth paying.

new political and economic system based on Western values, then | think the next century is likely to be marked by peace and prosperity. If they fail, we will have to confront a new array of challenges to our security

Unfortunately, all the elements are present for an outcome which would require us to rethink some of the assumptions upon which our current program is based:

O A disastrous economic situation that may not be repairable in time to avoid a social and political explosion;

Continuing differences between and among republics;

The absence of a tradition of either democracy or entrepreneurship and weak governing institutions;

Divisions within the military;

The existence of reactionary ideologues, popular resentments, xenophobia and potential nostalgia for Russia's lost empire.

The possibility of an economic and socio-political train wreck which would yield a very ugly regime in Russia cannot be wished away. A collapse of the democratic experiment in the former Soviet Union could lead to:

An authoritarian, remilitarized Russia that seeks to intimidate Eastern Europe or even reverse the process of democratization there;

An armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine which could lead to ecological disasters, large retugee flows to the West and and a threat to the security of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia;

O A breakdown of the nuclear command-and-control system with resulting loss of control over some nuclear weapons.

Such outcomes would be dangerous not only for the people

directly involved, but for Americans as well. We must do everything we can to assist them to avoid such outcomes. Experts often speak of the dangers of "Weimar Russia," in which initial advances toward democracy and economic stabilization fail and an authoritarian leader assumes power and rearms. In Weimar Germany, it took more than a decade before democracy failed; we do not know what might happen in Russia. If developments take such a turn, our current defense program will allow us to make the necessary mid-course corrections in the available warning time.

Despite the potential problems, the current trend of events remains positive and provides grounds for optimism. It enables us to contemplate changes in the international system which few would have had the temerity to dream of even one year ago.

If democracy matures in the key states of the former Soviet Union, there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions. Such democratic states will have more in common with us than in conflict. We could well imagine that in a crisis like Operations Desert Shield/Storm years from now, we will have not merely political, but military, support from Russia or other states of the former Soviet Union. In the nearer term, democratic progress in Russia, Ukraine or other former republics sets an example for the others. On the other hand, a slide to chaos or fascism in any one state could threaten democratic progress in its neighbors.

The uncertainties we face are likely to be with us for the remainder of this decade or longer. These

Silent Victory

Both the Cold War and the gulf war the first post-Cold War conflict - are challenges that we met with the help of an extensive system of security arrangements. In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. It represents yet another victory, a "silent victory" of building longstanding alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented "zone of peace" that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. The continued vitality of NATO and of our alliance with Japan, Korea and Australia, and the creation of an ad hoc coalition in Operations Desert Shield/Storm bring this victory into the post-Cold War world. In the long run, preserving and expanding on this silent victory will be just as important an achievement as either the successful containment of the Soviet Union or our defeat of Iraq.

Events in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union over the last year or more have greatly advanced the prospects for this silent victory. Some of the strongest advocates for strong transAtlantic bonds and a continued U.S. presence in Europe are the newly emerging democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. In 1991, the last Soviet troops were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a date was set for Soviet withdrawal from Poland. We have begun international cooperative training programs with these nations and opened regular defense dialogue. Liaison relations exist between them and NATO. Each of these nations faces economic, ethnic or regional security challenges; but there is progress being made.

Some thought that Germany could be unified only if it were neutral. From the start, the United States fought for a united Germany that would remain in NATO. Now

nations, America recaptured nearly 90 percent of the incremental costs we incurred in the war. Taken together, these efforts — combat forces, logistical support and financial participation -- make a remarkable record of burden-sharing on which we should try to build.

there is a united Germany in NATO and agreement for the complete removal of Soviet troops by 1994.

Democratic reformers in Russia, Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union now plan to attend a meeting with NATO ministers and ministers from Eastern European countries, including Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in the near future.

Events in 1991 affected our critical security relations in Asia, as well. For decades, the very real security threat from the Soviet Union had served as the primary rationale for the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Even as the Soviet threat passes, however, the need for strong U.S.-Japan ties persists; and the U.S. remains committed to Japan's security. This strong relationship helps to counter remaining security threats, to further enhance regional peace and stability, and to protect the wideranging U.S. interests in East Asia and beyond. Japan contributed to the Persian Gulf defense cooperation fund and subsequently dispatched mine sweepers to the gulf. Our forces stationed in Japan and generously supported by it played an important role in the gulf war.

In addition to Japan, we have active mutual security agreements with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, and have established non-treaty security relationships with several other countries. These ties will be important as the demise of Soviet communism begins to affect China, Vietnam and North Korea. North Korea's disturbing nuclear program, coupled with its record of support for international terrorism, and the tremendous military establishment it continues to support makes it the most serious single threat to peace in Asia. But the seven largest armies in the world are in the Pacific. Given our historic commitment to the region and its growing importance to us, continued security ties will be vital.

Finally, as we fought the gulf war, 38 members of the coalition stood alongside us. These and others from Europe, Asia, the Pacific and elsewhere contributed resources, logistical help, staging points or overflight rights. Through the financial participation of other

Mutual Interests

The growing strength of our allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. More reciprocal, more mature security relationships will be more sustainable over time. We will expect our allies to share with us the burden of leadership, and we will work with them towards this end.

The Persian Gulf war highlighted a fourth feature of our success, one painstakingly built throughout the 1980s. It is a victory of high-quality forces — of cutting-edge military technology effectively used by talented, well-trained individuals.

High-technology systems vastly increased the effectiveness of our forces. This war demonstrated dramatically the new possibilities of what has been called the militarytechnological revolution in warfare. This technological revolution encompasses many areas, including stand-off precision weaponry, sophisticated sensors, stealth for surprise and survivability, nightvision capabilities and anti-ballistic missile defenses. In large part, this revolution tracks the development of new technologies such as the manipulation of information by microprocessors that has become familiar in our daily lives. The exploitation of these new technologies promises to change the nature of warfare significantly, as did the earlier advent of tanks, airplanes and aircraft carriers.

The war tested an entire generation of new weapons and systems at the forefront of this revolution. In many cases, these weapons and systems were being used in largescale combat for the first time. In other cases, where the weapons had been used previously, the war represented their first use in large numbers. For example, precisionguided munitions are not entirely new they were used at the end of the Vietnam war in 1972 to destroy two bridges in Hanoi that had withstood multiple air attacks earlier in the war — but their use in large numbers represented a new stage in the history of warfare.

Technology greatly increased our battlefield effectiveness. Battlefield combat systems, like the M-1A1 tank, AV-8B jet and the AH64 Apache helicopter, and critical subsystems, like advanced fire control, the Global Positioning System and thermal and nightvision devices, gave the ground forces unprecedented maneuverability and reach. JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) offered a glimpse of new possibilities for battlefield intelligence. Our forces often found, targeted and destroyed the enemy's before he could return fire effectively.

The Persian Gulf war saw the first use of the Patriot (or, indeed, of any weapon) in an anti-ballisticmissile defense role. The war was not the first in which ballistic missiles were used, and there is no reason to think that it will be the last. Ballistic missiles offered Saddam Hussein some of his few, limited successes and were the only means by which he had a plausible opportunity (via the attacks on Israel) to achieve a strategic objective. While the Patriot was

effective against the conventionally armed Scud missiles in Saddam Hussein's inventory, we must anticipate that in the future more advanced types of ballistic missiles, some armed with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, will exist in the inventories of even Third World nations. More advanced forms of ballistic missile defense, as well as more effective methods of locating and attacking mobile ballistic missile launchers, will be necessary to deal with that threat.

The military technological revolution will continue to pose challenges to our forces both to keep up with competing technologies and to get the greatest potential from the systems we have. For example, the extensive use of precision munitions created a requirement for much more detailed intelligence than had ever existed before. It is no longer enough for intelligence to report that a certain complex of buildings housed parts of the Iraqi nuclear program; targeters now want to know precisely which function is conducted in which building - or even in which part.

least constrain the spread of advanced technologies, will be required to maintain our advantage.

A second aspect of the victory is the importance of high-quality troops and commanders. Warriors win wars, and smart weapons require smart people and sound doctrine to maximize their effectiveness. The highly trained, highly motivated all-volunteer force we fielded in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is the highestquality fighting force the United States has ever fielded.

Many aspects of the war the complexity of the weapon systems used, the multinational coalition, the rapidity and intensity of the operations, the harsh physical environment in which it was fought, the unfamiliar cultural environment and the threat of chemical or biological attack — tested the training, discipline and morale of the members of the armed forces. They passed the test with flying colors. From the very start, men and women in the theater, supported by thousands on bases and in headquarters around the world, devoted themselves with extraordinary skill and vigor to this sudden task. They skillfully mounted a major military operation far from the United States and in conditions vastly different from the notional theaters for which our forces had primarily trained in the Cold War.

Reflecting that American "can do” spirit, the campaign includes some remarkable examples where plans were improvised, workarounds were found and new ways of operating invented and rapidly put into practice. Over 98 percent of our all-volunteer force are high school graduates. They

are well-trained. When the fighting began, they proved not just their skills but their bravery and dedication. To continue to attract such people, we must continue to meet their expectations for top-notch facilities, equipment and training and to provide the quality of life they and their families deserve. In taking care of them, we protect the single most important strategic asset of our armed forces.

Their performance bore testimony to the high quality of the training they had received. Of particular note are the various training centers which use advanced simulation, computer techniques and rigorous field operations to make the training as realistic as possible and to exploit the benefits of subsequent critique and review. For example, many of the soldiers who fought in Desert Storm had been to the armored warfare training at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., which has been described as tougher than anything the troops ran into in Iraq. Similarly, the Air Force "Red Flag" exercise program, which employs joint and multinational air elements in a realistic and demanding training scenario, provided a forum for the rehearsal of tactics, techniques and procedures for the conduct of modern theater air warfare. That is the way training is supposed to work.

Our success in the gulf also reflected outstanding military leadership. The command arrangements and the skills of the military leadership were challenged by the deployment of such a large force in a relatively short period of time, the creation or substantial expansion of staffs at various levels of command and the establishment of working relationships among them, the melding of the forces of many different nations and of the different services into an integrated theater campaign, and the rapid pace of the war and the complexity of the operations. The result was an offensive operation of such speed and intensity that the enemy was never able to respond in an effective and coordinated manner after the first blows were struck.

The high quality of our forces was critical to the planning and execution of two very successful

Future Opponents

In addition, future opponents may possess more advanced weapons systems and be more skilled in using them. The war showed that we must work to maintain the tremendous advantages that accrue from being a generation ahead in weapons technology. Future adversaries may have ready access to advanced technologies and systems from the world arms market. A continued and substantial research and development effort, along with renewed efforts to prevent or at

deception operations that surprised and confused the enemy. The first deception enabled the coalition to achieve tactical surprise at the outset of the air war, even though the passage of the United Nations deadline made an attack predictable.

The second deception operation confused the Iraqis about the coalition's plan for the ground offensive. The success of this deception operation both pinned down several Iraqi divisions along the Kuwaiti coast and left the Iraqis completely unprepared to meet the coalition's "left hook" as it swung around the troop concentrations in Kuwait and enveloped them.

Finally, the skill and dedication of our forces was a critical element for the coalition's efforts to design and carry out a campaign that would, within the constraints imposed by military necessity, minimize the risks of combat for nearby civilians and treat enemy soldiers humanely. Coalition pilots took additional risks and planners spared legitimate military targets to minimize civilian casualties. Coalition air strikes were designed to be as precise as possible. Tens of thousands of Iraqi prisoners of war were cared for and treated with dignity and compassion.

offensive and defense capabilities to protect the U.S. and our allies;

Forward presence — maintaining forward-deployed or stationed forces to strengthen alliances, show our resolve and dissuade regional challenges;

Crisis response - providing forces and mobility to respond to crises and to reinforce forwarddeployed forces;

Reconstitution - maintaining the capability to generate wholly new forces to deter or respond to a renewed global threat.

The United States will continue to rely on its strategic nuclear deterrent capability, including a survivable command, control and communications system and a modified version of the traditional Triad. Our future forces will give less emphasis to land-based ICBMS and ready bombers.

Several events of 1991 have significantly affected our plans for strategic nuclear forces. In July, we signed a START agreement that, if ratified and implemented by both sides, will bring about the first negotiated reduction of strategic offensive nuclear systems. The START treaty is a major achievement. But it was begun in an earlier, Cold War era, and it took nine years to complete the negotiations.

After the Soviet coup failed in August, we did not believe that we had nine years to work out the next reduction in nuclear armaments. So the president moved at the end of September in several dramatic ways to abolish an entire class of short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from our seabased forces and to accelerate the implementation of the START treaty itself by taking off alert now --

instead of seven years hence – those ICBMs we intended to eliminate under START. So on Sept. 28th, the morning after the president's speech, I took off alert 45 percent of our ICBM launchers, or 450 Minuteman II ballistic missiles.

In addition, the president directed me to take our bomber force off alert. For the first time since Dwight Eisenhower was president, there are no American bombers, fueled, loaded with nuclear weapons, parked at the end of the runway, ready to go to war at a minute's notice. Obviously, we could regenerate the force if we had to, but we don't expect we'll have to any time in the near future.

In his Sept. 27th speech, the president also called for the Soviets to join in taking "immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes-whatever their source."

I might add that the Soviets have responded to the changes ---first, in steps Mr. Gorbachev announced last fall and more recently that President Yeltsin subsequently agreed to expand upon.

Regional Defense Strategy

The dramatic events of 1991 underscore the validity of the course that the president charted for U.S. national security 18 months ago. The core goals of the regional defense strategy are to protect American interests and to promote a more stable and democratic world. Threats to our critical interests could arise with little notice in various parts of the world, including Europe, Asia, Southwest Asia and Latin America. We want to ensure that non-democratic powers will not dominate regions of the world critical to us or come to pose a serious global challenge. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The regional defense strategy rests on four essential elements:

Strategic deterrence and defense - relying on a mix of

President's Address

In his State of the Union address, President Bush announced major reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear modernization programs. These steps are to be taken unilaterally and immediately:

The B-2 program will be terminated at 20 aircraft.

The Small ICBM program will be canceled entirely.

O Production of the W-88 warhead for Trident II SLBMS (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) will be terminated.

whether this will be the outcome is far from clear. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as-yetrobust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union and the possibility that they might revert to closed, authoritarian and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations.

Purchases of the advanced cruise missile beyond those already authorized will cease.

Together, the president's unilateral initiatives of the State of the Union and of last September have important implications for the base force. Immediately and unilaterally, the base force now includes 20 percent fewer bombers. With cancellation of the Small ICBM, the base force will include 500 Minuteman III ICBMs for the foreseeable future. We will retain 18 Trident submarines, though their ratio of high-yield W-88 to lower-yield W76 warheads will be much lower than previously planned.

The president also called upon the leaders of the four republics with nuclear forces on their territory to join the United States in even farther-reaching bilateral strategic arms reductions. He reiterated his proposal from last September that the former Soviet Union should eliminate all ICBMs with multiple warheads, the most destabilizing weapons systems, and promised in return to reduce significantly the number of our nuclear warheads at sea and on bombers.

If the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union agree to the president's bilateral proposals, we will make even more dramatic changes to the base force. Our 50 multiple-warhead Peacekeeper missiles would be eliminated, andall 500 Minuteman ICBMs would be downloaded to a single-warhead configuration. The 3,456 warheads attributable to our 18-submarine Trident force would be reduced approximately one-third by downloading re-entry vehicles from missiles or by removing missiles from submarines. This would cause the level of accountable warheads in our base force to decrease by 40 percent. In addition, a substantial number of bombers would be oriented primarily toward conven

tional missions, causing the actual number of warheads to be roughly half of what we planned to have under START.

The reform leaders of the newly independent states have clearly voiced their interest in reducing strategic forces inherited from the Soviet Union. They recognize we are not a threat and rightly view these forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West.

We hope to give the new commonwealth leaders impetus to make substantial reductions in these strategic forces to a level consistent with the absence of any threat from the West. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a substantial reduction in its strategic forces, Gen. Powell and I are confident that a strategic force that carries only half of the nuclear weapons of our previous base force would meet the security requirements of the United States and its allies.

We can foresee the possibility of a time when Russian nuclear weapons no longer pose a threat to the United States and its allies, and we no longer need to hold at risk what future Russian leaders hold dear. This would require unambiguous evidence of a fundamental reorientation of the Russian government: institutionalization of democracy, positive ties to the West, compliance with existing armsreduction agreements, possession of a nuclear force that is non-threatening to the West

with low numbers of weapons, non-MIRVed (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) and not on high alert status — and possession of conventional capabilities nonthreatening to neighbors.

A transformation of Russia along these lines should clearly be our goal. But we are not there yet, and

SDI Program

The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made missile-defense capability a realistic, achievable and affordable concept. Furthermore, a significant number of nations are now developing both ballistic missile capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves but also to have the ability to extend protection to all nations that are part of the broader community of democratic values. Like “extended deterrence" provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended protection" for friends and allies. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move beyond the ABM treaty toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing liberal democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles.

There are other steps we are taking as well to mitigate nuclear risk. As the threat of superpower nuclear confrontation recedes, we are considering how best to recalibrate the balance between military effectiveness and nuclear safety, security and control. We also are considering how to adapt risk-reduction measures, previously focused on the old Soviet Union, to cope with a more multipolar world in which nuclear capabilities are proliferating. President Bush's two initiatives have removed weapons which have caused the most safety and security concerns and created an environment amenable to further risk-reduction initiatives. The Failsafe and Risk Reduction Review, chaired by Ambassador