the divine promulgation of the Mosaic Law: causes whose influence must have produced a total and irremediable apostasy from true religion in the whole Jewish race, if it had not been perpetually counteracted by that Providence, which, without violating the analogy of nature, or infringing on the freedom and moral accountableness of man, yet directs the whole series of events so as to accomplish its own all-gracious purposes, out of evil bringing forth good, and perpetually advancing the cause of truth and righteousness.

I shall conclude this Lecture with some observations suggested by the subjects we have been now discussing. Let me then warn my readers against adopting a preconception, very injurious to the cause of religion with unthinking minds;—even that all the individuals whom God made use of as instruments for the deliverance of his people, are brought forward to our notice in Scripture as worthy of divine favour, and fit models for our imitation in the entire tenor of their lives. They generally indeed possessed the important and praiseworthy qualities of zeal and intrepidity in defence of their national religion and constitution, and were active and effective instruments in restoring the worship of Jehovah, and thus in the main forwarding the interests of virtue and religion. Hence, God frequently assisted their efforts with miraculous aid, or is said to have raised them up, or been with them as judges or kings of Israel. But we must by no means conceive that this implies, that the divine approbation attended all their conduct.

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The

Most of the difficulties and objections which appear to discredit the divine original of the Jewish revelation, are derived from the misconduct of the nation in general, or from the errors and crimes of some distinguished individuals, who were employed as instruments to forward the progress of the divine economy. In addition to such circumstances as have been advanced in this and the preceding Lectures, to obviate such difficulties and objections, the following remarks may perhaps not be useless.

It is said to be utterly incredible, that persons raised up, aided, inspired, directed, or assisted by God, should have been guilty of such crimes as David; such idolatries as Solomon; such weaknesses as Samson; such apostasies and cruelties as the Jews. To this it may be answered, that it is perfectly credible they should be raised up for particular purposes; aided in effecting a particular object; inspired with a certain degree of knowledge; assisted at particular periods, and in a special manner; and yet, that beyond this, their natural character, their external temptations, their acquired habits, may have produced all the irregularities and crimes which gave so much offence. To ask, why God did not prevent this? is to ask, why he did not exercise a greater degree of supernatural control than the peculiar

excesses of Samson, the rash vow of Jephthah, the ephod of Gideon, which proved a snare unto him and all his house, involving them in the guilt of idolatry; the excessive indulgence of Eli to his profligate sons; the manner in which the

purposes of Providence required? A question as absurd as it is presumptuous. On this subject, I transcribe the observations of Butler, Analogy, p. 260, which appear to me decisive. Having illustrated, by a variety of examples, that the system of nature is liable to objections, "a priori," analogous to those advanced against the scheme of revelation; and that as the former are admitted to be inconclusive objections to natural religion, the latter are equally so with regard to revelation; he proceeds, "By applying these general observations to a particular objection, it will "be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the like kind; and "indeed to almost all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from ob"jections against its evidence. It appears from Scripture, that as it was not un“usual in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to "be endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner; and this is made an objection "against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite "remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at first sight. For, "consider a person endued with any of these gifts; for instance, that of tongues: "it is to be supposed, that he had the same power over this miraculous gift, "as he would have had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, "as it ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other natural " endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner he did an "other; either regularly and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly and im " proper ones: according to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence, "Where then is the objection? Why, if this miraculous power was indeed given "to the world, to propagate Christianity and attest the truth of it we might, it "seems, have expected, that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be "invested with it; or that these should, at the same time have been endued with "prudence; or that they should have been continually restrained and directed "in the exercise of it: i. e. that God should have miraculously interposed, if at "all, in a different manner or higher degree. But from the observations made “above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges, in what degrees and "manners, it were to have been expected, he should miraculously interpose; upon "supposition of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural "course of Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and "other talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of them. Nor is the “instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of life particu" larly in our education, commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruc"tion."

Such are the observations of Butler; and they seem to show most clearly, the unreasonableness of disbelieving the reality of the divine interpositions in the Jewish scheme, merely from the crimes and idolatries of the nation at large, or of the most remarkable persons employed in those interpositions. God raised up various judges, and kings and prophets, to deliver, to instruct, and to govern his people;

sons of Samuel himself abused their pious parent's authority; the crimes even of David and Solomon; all these facts supply abundant proofs, that as in the people, so in the chiefs, there was a mixture of weakness and unsteadiness, an immaturity of

and he gave them such aids of valour, prudence, knowledge, and such a degree of success, as were sufficient for the purposes they were necessary to answer. But he did not make them, or the nation at large, infallible or impeccable. The judges often fell into errors and crimes: Samson abused his supernatural strength; David's piety and virtue were overpowered by criminal desire acquiring an undue ascendancy; Solomon, notwithstanding his extraordinary wisdom, was corrupted by sensuality, and fell into idolatry: and thus of the rest. But does this render it incredible that they were at all employed by God to effect his purposes, or on particular occasions assisted with extraordinary aid? Assuredly not. This would be to affirm that God could not interpose at all in human affairs, without interposing to such a degree, as would totally subvert the laws of man's moral nature, and the principles of his own moral government, by forcibly controlling human agency, and subverting all free will. The unreasonableness of supposing or expecting that the Deity should interpose to such a degree as this, is strongly and beautifully illustrated by archbishop King in his celebrated Treatise on the Origin of Evil; and his observations are applied to the subject before us, by his learned and ingenious annotator, bishop Law. I shall insert a short extract from each; vide King's Origin of Evil, translated by Law, chap. v. sect. v. Subsect. III. p. 359. "Such an interruption as this," (viz. God's restraining all exercises of free will, when they tend to vice and absurdity; vide the two preceding paragraphs, particularly p. 356.) "would not only do violence to nature, "but quite invert the method of treating free agents. This method is to hinder "or excite elections by rewards or punishments, to divert them from unreason"able or absurd things, and draw them to better by the persuasion of reason. "But it is doubtful whether the nature of the thing will permit an election to be "determined by impulse, or as it were by immediate contact, for it seems equally "absurd to attempt a change of election by any other means than those above "mentioned, as to desire to stop the motion of matter by entreaty or offering re"wards. May we not with the same reason expect that matter should be moved "by rewards and punishments, as the will influenced by physical impulse, as they call "it? for it is by these means they would have God to stop or alter the choice. So "preposterous an interposal would confound every thing, and leave nothing certain "in nature. How fatal such an experiment would be, and how it would affect "the minds of the observers; or what suspicions concerning God and their own se" curity, it might suggest to the whole system of thinking beings, God only knows. "We see that human laws cannot be dispensed with, without very many inconve"niencies, which yet, as they are made upon an imperfect foresight and can provide "for few cases, seem naturally to require some interposition. How much greater "evils may we apprehend from a dispensation with the divine, the natural laws, on "the observance of which the good of the whole depends. This seems to be the "reason why God makes use of so much labour and pains, so great an apparatus of "means, so many precepts, persuasions, and even entreaties for the amendment of • mankind, which nevertheless he could effect in a moment if he were pleased to apply force; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not foreseen more incon

intellect, and dullness of sentiment as to morality and religion, which, though controlled and overruled by Providence, so as to prevent them from defeating the great objects of the divine dispensations, which these individuals were otherwise qualified to

"veniences from a change in the order of nature, and violence done to elections." On the preceding paragraph his Annotator very truly remarks, “The history of the "Jewish nation affords good instances of this: what an apparatus of outward means "was continually made use of in the government of that stiff-necked people! What "trequent murmurings, rebellions and apostasies were permitted and then punished | "What numerous miracles, both of the remunerative and vindictive kind, were ap"plied, in order to bring them to some tolerable sense of their dependence on God, "and suitable practice of the duties resulting from it! All which would have been "6 unnecessary at least, if one miracle exerted on their minds could have done the "business: if their understandings could as well have been illuminated, and their "wills reformed at once; and if their practice produced by this means, and, as it were, extorted from them, would have been equally agreeable to the Deity. And "in this, as well as many other respects, they seem to have been types and representa"tives of all mankind."

Archbishop King's idea of the nature of God's moral government, in Subsect. v. of the same chapter, seems to me so just, and to cast so much light on many facts and arguments considered in this Work, I cannot forbear transcribing it. "As it would be prejudicial to man, to all nature, for God to hinder bad elections by his absolute power, so nothing can be conceived so disagreeable to himself. "We have said, that God made the world, in order to have something whereon to "exercise his attributes externally. But since he has several attributes, he cannot "exercise them all in every thing alike: his power, therefore, exerts itself chiefly "in one thing, his wisdom and goodness in another. He exercised his power in "creating the world and putting it into motion; his goodness and wisdom in the "order and agreement of things. But the Divine Wisdom seems to have set apart "the government of free agents as its peculiar province; herein it fully exercises "itself, and acts up to its infinity; for if it were finite, it would not be equal to so "great a task. It does not seem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to 46 govern and absolutely direct such beings as are merely passive, and deprived of "all motion of their own, whereby they might make resistance; for those things "obey easily which do not move but when they are moved, neither is there need "of infinite wisdom to govern them; for infinite power with a moderate use of "wisdom would have been sufficient. That there might be a subject, therefore, "whereon the infinite wisdom of God should display itself, he created free agents; "which being as it were put out of his power and left to themselves, might act in "a manner independent of his will. It is evident to any person, how much more "difficult it is, and how much greater exercise of wisdom it requires, to direct a "multitude of these to a certain end, and make them conspire to the common good, "than to order brute beasts, and such as have no power of themselves, in what manner you please. To them that consider the vast multitude of free agents, "which is almost infinite, and their independence (since every one is, at least in Imany cases, absolute master of his own actions, and is permitted by God to act "according to that liberty) God seems to have given a specimen of the extent of his "wisdom, which is able thus certainly and ffectually to bring to the end proposed

promote, yet should always prevent us from considering them as held forth by Scripture as, in every instance of their conduct favored of God and to be imitated by man. In general, indeed, this is expressly noted in the Scripture itself, and an imme

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"so many free spirits, so many agents that were in a manner set at liberty from "his dominion, and committed every one to his own government. Here is the proper place for wisdom, wherein setting aside and in a manner suspending the "exercise of his power, he attains his ends by prudence only, by mere dexterity of "acting; and brings it to pass, that so many jarring wills, depending on themselves "alone, and no more inclined to either side by the divine Power, than if there "were no such thing, shall yet conspire together to promote the good of the uni"verse." Colliber's opinion, as quoted by Law, shall close this already too long note, for which the importance of the subject will, it is hoped, apologize. "It "was highly suitable," (says this judicious writer) "to the Divine Wisdom, in the "government of the world, both to pre-ordain some of the principal events, with "relation to the entire human community, or to the more considerable parts of it, "and to reserve to himself a right of interposing, and influencing particular agents; "as in other cases, so more especially in order to the accomplishment of these events. "That he has actually done so, is abundantly evident from Scripture prophecies "and histories; and that in so doing he has acted in a manner most worthy his "wisdom, is no less manifest. For hereby it appears, that the divine government " is equally opposed to chance and destiny. Had the Deity taken no care of futu"rity, but left every man to the conduct of his own inclination, and natural effects "in general to the influence of their causes without ever interposing to direct them "to the attainment of his great design, this would have been almost in effect to di"vest himself of the government of rational agents, and to subject their affairs to "chance, and to the hazard of the utmost disorder and confusion; or had he on "the contrary, absolutely or fatally determined every event, though this would have "been far enough from divesting himself of the government of the world, yet it “would have been a government unworthy of the Deity, a government entirely ex"clusive of all proper sin and punishment, virtue and reward; wherein he himself "would have been in effect the only agent, and we the creatures stupid and pas"sive; whereas, by pre-ordaining the more material events and suffering the crea"tures freely to exert their faculties in all convenient cases, he appears most wisely "to have chosen the middle way, and thereby to have equally avoided the mischiefs "of both extremes."

For more on this difficult subject, I refer to King's Work at large, to which, as far as appears to me, no adequate answer has been given. I would also entreat the iuquiring reader to consider what has been advanced by Butler, in his Analogy, Part I. ch. iii. Of the moral government of God; ch. vi. Of the opinion of necessity, as influencing practice; and ch. vii. Of the government of God, as being imperfectly comprehended; as well as ch. v. Of a state of moral discipline, Ho would soon be convinced how idly, ignorant and superficial sceptics object to what God has done; from their wild theories as to what, in their opinions, he might, should, or could have done.

This is remarkably conspicuous in the cases of Samson and Eli, David and Solemon.