Replicating Microfinance in the United States"With the publication of this volume, knowledge and understanding of the practices of delivering micro-credit reach a new level of consolidation, and the stage is set for important further steps."—from the Foreword by Richard P. Taub, University of Chicago Microfinance was pioneered in the developing world as the lending of small amounts of money to entrepreneurs who lacked the kinds of credentials and collateral demanded by banks. Similar practices spread from the developing to the developed world, reversing the usual direction of innovation, and today several hundred microfinance institutions are operating in the United States. Replicating Microfinace in the United States reviews experiences in both developing and industrialized countries and extends the applications of microlending beyond enterprise to consumer finance, housing finance, and community development finance, concentrating especially on previously underserved households and their communities. Contributors include Nitin Bhatt, Robert M. Buckley, Bruce Ferguson, Elinor Haider, Chi-kan Richard Hung, Sally R. Merrill, Jonathan Morduch, Gary Painter, Sohini Sarkar, Mark Schreiner, Lisa Servon, Ayse Can Talen, Shui-Yan Tang, Kenneth Temkin, Andres Vinelli, J. D. Von Pischke and Marc A. Weiss. Replicating Microfinance in the United States is based on papers commissioned by the Fannie Mae Foundation and findings from an October 2001 conference jointly held by the Fannie Mae Foundation and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. |
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In case one member is unwilling to do so, other group members have the incentive to μnd out as early as possible—ideally, when peer groups are formed; or exert peer pressure after a group is formed and loans are approved.
The purpose is to establish a norm of loan repayment and to provide incentives for group members to share the responsibility of loan screening, monitoring, and enforcement. Although all programs impose joint liability on group members ...
... the incentives inherent in the joint-liability rule. Moreover, as will be discussed in a later section, training of borrowers may improve their project risk, and compensate for the limitation of the joint-liability rule.
As is discussed below, both pieces of legislation created strong incentives for lenders and the two largest loan purchasers—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—to initiate steps that allow lenders to originate more loans to low-income and ...
According to Fishbein (1992), this opportunity allows for substantive public input, and creates an incentive for some lenders to take steps to improve their service of underserved markets. There is some evidence that these public ...